In the last years, the design of supervision against money laundering has become increasingly essential in agendas of governments through the creation of specialized agencies: the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). The economics of Anti Money Laundering (AML) suggested that the Financial model of FIU (FFIU), which is the regime adopted for example in the US, should be the best choice. Nevertheless, although nowadays the FFIU is still the most common framework, an empirical analysis of the FIUs establishment shows a more nuaced reality; it is discovered that, after the 2001 terrorist attack, the adoption of FFIU is unlikely. September Eleven seems to be the key event in the more recent design of the supervisory architecture against money laundering, signalling that politicians seem to prefer the Law Enforcement model of FIU (LEFIU). Using a political economy model two possible and non-alternative explanations are offered.
INTRODUCTION
The very origins of the Anti Money Laundering (AML hereafter) regulation date back to 1986, when in the US the Money Laundering Control Act was the first law in the world to contrast money laundering activities. The pioneering efforts in studying the money laundering activities belong to Quirk (1996) , Masciandaro (1998 and , Walker (1999) , Tanzi (2000) , Chong and Lopez de Silanes (2006), Schneider (2008) and Barone and Masciandaro (2008) . In the last two decades, the design of regulation and supervision against money laundering has become increasingly essential in agendas of governments. In this perspective, the common orientation has been the creation of specialized agencies with clear responsabilities: the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs hereafter). Based upon the Egmont Group definition, we can describe the FIUs as: "a central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted, requesting) , analyzing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial information: (i) concerning suspected proceeds of crime, or (ii) required by national legislation or regulation, in order to counter money laundering." Two major influences shape the creation of the FIUs: implementing AML departments or offices, alongside already existing law enforcement systems (The Judicial, Law Enforcement and Hybrid models) or providing a single agency for centralizing the receipt and assessment of financial information and sending the resulting disclosures to competent authorities (The Administrative Model). As a result, five institutional models arise: -The Judicial Unit is established within the judicial branch of government wherein disclosures of suspicious financial activity are received by the investigative agencies of a country from its financial sector such that the judiciary powers can be brought into play e.g. seizing funds, freezing accounts, conducting interrogations, detaining people, conducting searches, etc.
-The Law Enforcement Unit implements anti money laundering measures alongside already existing law enforcement systems, supporting the efforts of multiple law enforcement or judicial authorities with concurrent or sometimes competing jurisdictional authority to investigate money laundering; -The Administrative Unit is a centralized, independent, administrative authority, which receives and processes information from the financial sector and transmits disclosures to judicial or law enforcement authorities for prosecution. It functions as a buffer between the financial and the law enforcement institutions.
We can distinguish between the Financial Administrative Units -Financial or Banking FIUs hereafter or FFIU -and Non-Financial Administrative Units. The former works within the Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, or Banking Supervisory Authority and has large financial skills. In opposition to this, the Non-Financial Administrative FIUs do not have a financial nature, i.e. do not work within or are not a financial department.
-The Hybrid Unit serves as a disclosure intermediary and a link to both judicial and law enforcement authorities. It combines elements of at least two of the FIU models above.
Which is the more effective model in combating money laundering? So far the AML economic literature - Takáts (2007) , Masciandaro et al. (2007) , Costa (2008) , Dalla Pellegrina and Masciandaro (2009) -accumulated arguments in favour of the FFIU model, which increases the gains in terms of collecting and processing information. However, the reality is more nuanced. In this paper, we show that the FFIU is adopted by more than half of 65 countries in a large and heterogenous sample but, although a partial convergence, there is no a dominant framework. This point is slightly surprising and therefore it deserves a deeper attention. Here we proposed both a theoretical and an empirical analysis. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sections 3 and 4 provides the data description, while in Section 5 we implement the econometric analysis. Section 6 concludes.
DESIGNING THE FFIU: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS
How to analyse the pros and cons in establishing a FFIU? On the topic, it is possible to disentangle the pros (insider view) and cons (outsider view).
The financial nature of the FIU (insider view) has been supported by arguments related to the informational advantages and economies of scale that derive from bringing the financial intelligence function under the umbrella of the authority in charge of managing the overall banking supervision, i.e. Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, Banking Supervisory Authority. The insider view supports the establishment of a financial FIU as a device to improve the quality of the AML regulation. This view has been adopted by the AML prevalent literature, such as Takáts (2007) , Masciandaro et al. (2007) , Costa (2008), Dalla Pellegrina and Masciandaro (2009) . At the same time, it is worth noting that banking supervisors completely involved in the AML regulation can produce policy failure costs, which are absent if the supervisor is an outsider (outsider view), i.e. FIU model is not Financial.
The risk of policy failure can be differently motivated, shedding light basically on two main sources of the policy failure: first, the capture risk. The more the AML supervisor is a financial authority, the more likely are the risks of capture by the regulated firms, which can reduce drastically the quality of regulation. Second, the bureaucratic risk. The more the AML supervisor is a financial agency, the more the risks to have an overpowerful AML regulator arise. Therefore the bottom line becomes how to weigh pros and cons to reach a more stable solution. In other words, putting together the evidence over the different AML frameworks across countries and the controversial views on the Financial FIUs shows that the mere economic analysis is not sufficient to explain the current settings of the FIUs around the world, meaning that an alternative approach is needed.
In this perspective, here we go ahead in studying the design of FIUs using a delegation framework 1 .
In doing so, we adopt a political economy approach 2 that argues that the policymaker's actual choices 1 The principal-agent pattern has been already used to describe the AML regulation: the agency problem between banks and policymakers (two players only) has been already studied by Takáts (2007) , who focus on the fact that excessive fines may end up generating a larger number of useless reports. See also Masciandaro et al. (2007) and Costa (2008) . For the failure of traditional sanction methods, see Bowles et al. (2005) . 2 Masciandaro (2006) , (2007) and (2009), Masciandaro and Quintyn (2008) , Volpicella (2014a) and (2014b). related to the FIUs model are conditional on the economic and institutional environment existing at a given time, which in turn determines the political weights put on the pros and cons.
Our framework is based on two hypotheses. First of all, gains and losses of a given FIU setting are variables computed by the incumbent policymaker, who maintains or reforms the FIU regime following his/her (hereafter her) own preferences. Secondly, policymakers are politicians, and as such, they are held accountable at elections for how they have managed to please voters 3 . All politicians are career-oriented agents, motivated by the goal of pleasing voters in order to win elections. The main difference among various types of politicians concerns which kinds of voters they wish to please in the first place. Therefore the FIU design is likely to change over time following the political preferences, which are not automatically coincident with the social ones.
Consider a closed economy with rational expectations and uncertainty. We suppose that the citizens like an effective FIU setting.
The more the FIU is able to set controls on the financial system, the more its capacity to prevent and to address any money laundering activity coming from the financial firms will be enlarged. Given that the economics suggests that an optimal FIU should be Financial, in our political model we suppose that the FIU can be Financial.
The citizens acknowledge that the definition of the optimal level of a Financial FIU means to exploit the trade-off between advantages in having a Financial FIU (insider view) and higher risks above (outsider view).
Citizens care about the effectiveness of the FIU regime according to a classic well-behaved concave function u = U (y): social welfare increases with the optimal level of Financial FIU. Linear preferences are used:
In a democracy, citizens assign to the elected policymaker the task of designing the optimal level of the Financial FIU, i.e. the setting that guarantees the effectiveness of the AML framework. For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that the elected policymaker represents both the legislative and the executive powers, i.e. the interests of the majority of the Parliament and of the government in charge are perfectly aligned.
The incumbent policymaker is delegated by society to define and implement the optimal level of the Financial FIU. The policymaker reward is based on how she carries out her job, i.e. defining and implementing the level of Financial FIU.
Our policymaker is a politician. Here we assume that the policymaker wishes to please the citizens; one more assumption could be that the policymaker's aim is to please specific constituencies, i.e. the . We adopt the helping hand view of the policymaker's type: she wishes to please citizens rather than a particular constituency or lobby (grabbing hand view). It will be interesting to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the policymaker wishes to please the citizens, the final outcome -the actual level of Financial FIU -can be different from the social optimal one.
The level y of Financial FIU is determined by the policymaker's ability Ω and by her effort a.
Let us describe the delegation framework. The sequence of events is as follows:
-) Society chooses to delegate to the policymaker the task of designing the optimal level of Financial FIU; -) Next, the policymaker chooses effort a, before knowing her ability Ω in implementing this particular task (building up a Financial FIU is neither an usual nor a day by day operation);
-) The policymaker implements the FIU regime, revealing her ability Ω; -) Citizens observe the Financial FIU level -not the relationship between effort and ability, given that they cannot distinguish innate talent from contingent effort -and reward the policymaker for this task.
Coming back to the policymaker, her utility function HH Z is defined as:
Where R (U) is the reward function and C (a) is the cost function. The political reward is function of the social utility, while the political costs are function of the effort in implementing the task. The policymaker evaluates every task assignment while taking into account the political rewards and costs in doing so. Let us describe the three crucial features of the policymaker: A) Ability: the ability of the policymaker is a random variable with the usual normal distribution (where AV  is the mean); B) Political Reward: The incumbent policymaker wishes to be re-elected. The government needs to provide enough utility to the majority of voters; then her utility function is the social welfare function U.
In general, the policymaker wishes to please voters and her goal is the alignment of interest between her and citizens. But then each delegated task, i.e. each specific alignment, can be more or less convenient from the policymaker's point of view in terms of political gains. We denote the political value she assigns to fulfil the specific task on CBI with β -with
The incentives alignment between the policymaker and citizens is a necessary and sufficient condition to find the optimal behaviour of the policymaker. One more step is necessary to find out the effective political reward. The reward will be useful if the citizens' utility exceeds the minimum threshold of utility W that they expect from an incumbent government (political competition condition).
Citizens compare government performances with the expected performances of outside politicians.
The political competition condition can be defined as follows:
Therefore the usefulness of the political reward will depend on condition (4). C) Political Costs: The policymaker knows that the more the FIU will be Financial, the more it will be likely that two costs can arise. On the one side, the capture risk (capture failure, CF). The more the AML supervisor is a Financial authority, the more likely are the risks of capture by the regulated firms, which can reduce drastically the quality of regulation. Second, the bureaucratic risk (bureaucratic failure, BF). The more the AML supervisor is a Financial agency, the more the risks to have an over-powerful AML regulator arise.
In other words, we assume that from the policymaker's point of view, the political costs of implementing a Financial FIU regime will depend on her expectations of facing the capture risk and the bureaucratic dominance of the Financial FIU as an over-powerful agency.
Therefore the policymaker cost function can assume the following simple specification:
Where and each probability is between 0 and 1.
The political cost of the effort in establishing a Financial FIU regime depends on how the incumbent government is blamed when a public failure occurred, i.e. on the size of the reputation losses.
When a public failure occurs, citizens can be more or less sensitive. From the government's point of view, the failure likelihood per se is not relevant, but its political cost affects her reputation. The reputation factor is represented by the parameter 1 c . For the sake of simplicity, we assume a) that the negative effect on the government's reputation is the same irrespective of the type of failure; and b) the failures are independently distributed. We will see that the size of the political costs can determine the difference between the optimal FIU regime and the actual one.
Establishing the Financial FIU is a two-step process: defining the policymaker effort; evaluating the Financial FIU level. In defining her optimal effort 1 a the policymaker maximises her objective function. Then her ability HH  becomes evident, the level of Financial FIU can be evaluated using the equation (2) and her final political reward can be calculated using the political competition equation (4). It follows that the policymaker maximises social welfare net of costs of executing the task:
Given that the level of social utility is equal to the level of Financial FIU, which is function of the policymaker effort, it is evident that both the rewards and the costs depend on the effort:
From the first order condition, the optimal effort will be: 
The equilibrium level y of the Financial FIU will be determined by the policymaker's ability HH  and by her effort 1 a :
Given the exogenous policymaker ability, on one hand, the level of Financial FIU depends on how politically relevant it is for the government to build up a central bank regime pleasing the majority of voters, which dislikes the systemic risk situations. In other words, the policymaker's perception of the social relevance of the FIU setting matters. On the other hand, the government takes into account the expected costs of facing the political costs which may arise when a Financial FIU is established.
The parameter 1 c can be easily used to show under which conditions the actual level of Financial FIU is different from the social optimal one. In fact, we can suppose that the citizens acknowledge the existence of risks in having a Financial FIU. Therefore, the social optimal value of the reaction parameter The theoretical framework can be used to explain the reasons why the FIU settings around the world can be so different at a given time. In this perspective, we highlight that gains and losses of a FIU regime are variables computed by the incumbent policymaker, who maintains or reforms the institutional setting, following her preferences. Therefore any situation that influences the policymaker's gains and costs in changing the regime can produce incentives to modify the Financial FIU level.
As a matter of fact, if the incumbent governments feel that the society aversion against money laundering is increasing, an institutional reform focused on FIU setting is likely to produce higher political gains. In our model, the value of the parameter β increases as well as the level of Financial FIU. At the same time, any situation that changes the policymaker's political costs 1 c in reforming the regime can produce incentives to modify the Financial FIU level. For example, the policymaker's incentives to decrease the level of Financial FIU are likely to increase if the expectations of the incumbent government to face public failures, i.e. capture and bureaucratic risks, become relevant. The model predicts that the FFIU design depends on the policymaker's preferences.
DATASET AND VARIABLES
Is it possible to detect which are the preferences in defining the FIU designs around the world? Before delivering some facts and trends about FIUs, we present our dataset and variables. The empirical analysis is based on data collected for 65 countries that are heterogeneous in terms of institutional framework and stage of economic development. ; an index of development stage (DEV).
As shown, our political economy model is based on a helping hand/benevolent policymaker. As a result, we want to control for the presence of dishonest policymakers. In doing so, we use a legal effectiveness index (LAWEFF)
13
. We also want to control for continental effect (variable CONT), given that imitation mechanisms may arise 14 .
Other institutional variables include the religion (RELIGION) and legal origin (LEGAL).
At the same time, as some countries joint international AML organizations, they changed their FIU framework; for that reason, we build the variable FIUINTMEMB as total number of the international AML organizations to which a country belongs
15
. Last but not least, our dataset also contains the variable ESTABLISHMENT describing the year in which the current setting of a certain FIU has been established.
Minor changes, which have not affected the model of FIU, have not been taken into account in computing this variable. Note that we consider the de jure establishment.
For more details on variables, see the Table A1 in the Appendix.
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENT UNITS: SOME FACTS AND TRENDS
In this Section, we provide a descriptive overview of the FIUs setting around the world. As a matter of fact, in recent years, the design of regulation against money laundering has been influenced by an interesting phenomenon: to ensure economic and financial integrity, FIUs have been instituted in several countries, to make the national and international fight against organized crime and terrorism more effective.
In other words, an Authority with clear responsibilities in detection money laundering activities is arising.
8 Given the climatic conditions, economies closer to the equator are thought to be less hospitable for the development of financial markets. For more details on the latitude as proxy of financial development, see Beck et al. (2001) . 9 Masciandaro (2007) built the index. 10 We update the index as proposed in Masciandaro (2007) . 11 Average value computed for years 2009 Average value computed for years , 2010 Average value computed for years , 2011 Average value computed for years and 2012 Average value computed for years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. 13 Kaufmann (2004) . 14 For instance, the FIU of Macedonia is expressly based on the model of the Norwegian FIU. 15 We consider a total of 12 international Anti Money Laundering organizations. For more details, see the countries have a Judicial FIU (JFIU) (6.2%) and 6 countries show a Hybrid model (HFIU) (9.2%). As a result, the Financial FIU arises as the most adopted model, but almost half of countries sets a different framework.
In other words, there are broad differences across countries. Figure 1 shows the relative distribution of the FIUs models across countries. A mere descriptive analysis seems to suggest that ANONFFIU and HFIU adoption is not affected by the stage of development, while emerging and developing countries are slightly more likely to set up FFIUs (Row a). In this perspective, it is noteworthy that FFIUs are generally associated with a lower GDP per capita (Row c) and most of countries adopting FFIU are not OECD-economies (Row p).
We also observe that FFIUs seem to be correlated with a non-fully developed financial industry (Rows d and e). We acnowledge that this analysis is merely a prime descriptive overview and is not able to capture the empirical drivers which shape the FIUs. As shown in Paragraph 5, an econometric approach is needed. 
DESIGNING THE FFIU: EMPIRICS
In this Section, we implement an econometric analysis to understand which drivers explain the creation of the FFIUs running a cross-section study.
ESTIMATION AND RELATED ISSUES
We estimate the following equation:
Where subscript i identifies each country in our sample. . Given that our framework relies on benevolent policymakers, we insert a proxy of the quality of law to avoid distortions deriving from the presence of corrupted policymakers, i.e. grabbing-hand politicians, and to obtain parameters related to the choice made by a benevolent government in terms of model of FIU. Finally, ε i is an idiosyncratic normally distributed error term with zero mean and constant variance.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no prior studies on the empirics of AML. As a result, the choice of regressors is somehow critical. However, as we can consider the FFIU, given its financial nature, part of the supervision structure, we rely on the standard controls presented by supervision literature, such as economic development, financial industry and other institutional variables. Furthermore, we also control for the structure of supervision because, as shown, the FFIU works within a Financial authority, i.e. Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, Banking Authority, which is often in charge of supervision of the financial industry, i.e. banking sector, securities, insurers.
Specification of equation (1) may give rise to issues of causality between the dependent and the independent variables, i.e. endogeneity. We believe that the current FIU regime is very unlikely to affect our covariates, meaning that the possibility of simultaneous determination of FIU model and regressors should be prevented.
Equation (1) is estimated by using a Logit model in order to obtain the expected value of the likelihood that the FIU is Financial. Robust standard errors are used to fix the eteroskedasticity. We also checked for the presence of outliers 19 .
RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 19 DFBETA method has been used. 20 Size-country effect is not uncommon in supervision. For instance, see Masciandaro (2007) . 21 In our sample, we have 7 African countries: each of them adopts a Banking FIU.
another way, policymakers tend to abandon the Financial framework and rely on the Law Enforcement model, which implies higher investigation and police skills. The September Eleven is a key event in modelling national FIUs.
It is worth noting that results above derive from a cross-section approach; most of countries in our sample adopted a formal FIU for the first time, meaning that it is not possible to run a time-series analysis nor using a dynamic approach.
In order to verify our results, we also implemented some robustness checks. First, Columns (3) and (4) show that results are consistent with a Probit model. Source: Authors' calculations. Note: ***, **, * Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
CONCLUSION
Over the recent years, the design of the supervision against money laundering has been influenced by an interesting phenomenon: to ensure economic and financial integrity, FIUs have been instituted in several countries, to make the national and international fight against organized crime and terrorism more effective.
In other words, an Authority with clear responsibilities in detection money laundering activities is arising. The distribution of FIUs models shows that the Financial FIU is the most adopted model, but almost half of countries in the sample sets a different framework. Put it in another way, there are broad differences across countries. The evidence above slightly contrasts with the traditional economics of AML supervision, which considers the FFIU as the best option.
In order to solve the puzzle, we yield a political economy framework, in which any situation that influences the policymaker's gains and costs in designing the regime can produce incentives to adopt or not the Financial FIU model and consequently the kind of FIU itself as well. Our framework shows the role of the policymaker's preferences in explaining the FIU design.
By using an econometric approach, we discovered that the year of establishment plays a key role in affecting the likelihood to have a Financial FIU: the more the establishment is recent, the less the probability to set up a FFIU. It seems that in the last years the preferences in favour of the FFIU became weaker, leading politicians to adopt other models. We also find that, after the terrorist attack on 2001 in the US, the adoption of Financial framework is less likely, while that of Law Enforcement model goes up. Such a change is statistically significant and is likely to be driven by the need to strength the anti-terrorism regulation. Being the Law Enforcement model more skilled in police and investigation powers than the FFIU framework, one possible explanation consistent with our model is that, after the terrorist attack, some policymakers felt that the benefits in choosing the FFIU are lower than the gains in establishing the LEFIU model. At the same time, we cannot exclude a priori one more explanation, which is not alternative with the former: some politicians took the September Eleven event as an occasion to choose a FIU model with less net risks in terms of having financial capture and/or an over-powerful financial bureaucracy. Financial Authority consolidation index: 7 = Single authority for all three sectors (total number of supervisors=1); 5 = Single authority for the banking sector and securities markets (total number of supervisors=2); 3 = Single authority for the insurance sector and the securities markets, or for the insurance sector and the banking sector (total number of supervisors=2); 1 = Specialized authority for each sector (total number of supervisors=3).We assigned a value of 5 to the single supervisor for the banking sector and securities markets because of the predominant importance of banking intermediation and securities markets over insurance in every national financial industry. We update the index proposed in Masciandaro (2007) . Horáková and Jordan (2013) , Masciandaro (2007) and Authorities websites.
Year of Establishment (ESTABLISHMENT)
Year of establishment of current model of FIU. Minor changes, i.e. changes which do not affect the model of FIU, are not considered.
FIUs websites

September Eleven (SEPTEMBERELEV EN)
English Legal Origin(ENGLISH)
The Legal Origin is English. 0=no; 1=yes. Djankov et al. (2007) 
French Legal Origin (FRENCH)
The Legal Origin is French. 0=no; 1=yes. Djankov et al. (2007) 
German Legal Origin (GERMAN)
The Legal Origin is German. 0=no; 1=yes. Djankov et al. (2007) 
Scandinavian Legal Origin (SCAND)
The Legal Origin is Scandinavian. 0=no; 1=yes. Djankov et al. (2007) 
Socialist Legal Origin (SOC)
The Legal Origin is Socialist. 0=no; 1=yes. Djankov et al. (2007) 
Development Stage (DEV)
1=developing and emerging countries; 2= advanced countries According to the World Bank classification, out of 65 countries in our sample, we have 39 advanced economies, 24 emerging countries and only 2 developing nations (Kenya and Zimbabwe).
For that reason, we decided to merge the emerging and developing economies into a single group.
World Bank
OECD (OECD)
0=no; 1=yes. OECD
European Union (EU)
Membership to European Union. 0=no; 1=yes. European Commission
Corruption index (CORRIND)
The index ranges from 1 to 10. A higher value indicates a higher score (lower corruption).
Transparency International (website), latest year available and Kaufmann et al. (2003) and Kaufmann (2004) 
Judicial Efficiency (JUDEF)
The index ranges from 1 to 10. A higher value implies a higher rating (lower corruption).
Kaufmann et al. (2003)
Good Governance (NEWGG)
Mean of the average values of the six components of governance over the period 1996 -2004 covering years 1996 ,1998 ,2000 ,2002 ,2004 . Kaufmann (2004 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)
Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors. Data are in current U.S. dollars. Average value for years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 . Data are in natural logarithm.
World Bank
Exports (EXP)
Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world as percentage of GDP. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments. Average value for years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. World Bank
Shadow Economy as percentage of GDP (SHADOW)
The shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes; to avoid payment of social security contributions; having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc; and complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires or administrative forms. Percentage of GDP, average value 1999 . Schneider and Williams (2013 and Bühn et al. (2010) 
Growth Domestic Product (GDP)
Nominal GDP (current US$), average value for years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. World Bank 
